FREE RIDING AND INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN THE REPUTATION OF AN ANONYMOUS GROUP

Authors

  • Dragan Filipovich Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, A. C.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v1i1.123

Keywords:

Group Reputation, s, Anonymity, and Random Matching

Abstract

This paper studies incentives to invest in "group reputation" when sorne agents are unable to recognize their partners from past interactions ( i. e., anonymity). lt does this by embedding the Kreps-Wilson (1982a) model of reputation and entry deterrence in a random-matching game (instead of just looking at isolated bilateral interactions). Examples are presented of how this affects investments in reputation under differing assumptions on how information is shared amongs agents.

Downloads

How to Cite

Filipovich, D. (2017). FREE RIDING AND INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN THE REPUTATION OF AN ANONYMOUS GROUP. Revista Mexicana De Economía Y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), 1(1). https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v1i1.123

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 1: Marzo

Section

Artículos