SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INEFFICIENT CORPORATE DECISIONS

Jorge Fernández Ruiz

doi:10.21919/remef.v1i2.128

SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INEFFICIENT CORPORATE DECISIONS

Authors

Jorge Fernández Ruiz Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, A. C.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v1i2.128

Keywords:

Short-term signals, adverse selection

Abstract

We analyze a model in which a firm raises funds from asymmetrically informed investors. The firm's short-term performance may alleviate t his adverse selection problem, but it may also give incentives for inefficient behavior. We study the equilibrium behavior resulting from the interplay of these effects.

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How to Cite

Fernández Ruiz, J. (2017). SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INEFFICIENT CORPORATE DECISIONS. Revista Mexicana De Economía Y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), 1(2). https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v1i2.128